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ABSTRACT 
The recent financial crisis has highlighted conflicts of interests between socio-economic 
groups over economic policy. We use representations of economies as systems of 
interdependencies among productive sectors to conceptualize economic and political 
cleavages in terms of the contingent interplay of economic interdependencies between 
sectors and political conflict between the groups that represent those sectors. In doing so, 
we propose a structural and historical approach, which is illustrated with reference to three 
moments in the evolution of the eighteenth-century British fiscal system. Each of these 
case studies (the Beer Taxes of the 1690s, the Excise Crisis of 1733, and the Income Taxes 
of the Napoleonic Wars) reveals a different dimension of our approach. We close with 
some reflections on the conditions under which political conflict may be sustainable and 
provide directions for further inquiry. 
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I. Introduction 
The recent financial crisis has highlighted conflicts of interests between socio-economic 
groups over economic policy. The disputes over who does and who should bear the greatest 
burden of taxation have been particularly important both in terms of absolute levels of 
income taxation and their progressivity and in view of proposals to raise or lower value-
added taxes either to balance budgets or as fiscal stimulus. These debates are particularly 
pressing in Britain and France but also resonate with Italian, Spanish and German voters.  
 
This essay makes the case for conceptualizing such cleavages in terms of the interplay of 
economic interdependencies between sectors and political conflict between the groups that 
represent those sectors. It proposes a structural and historical approach, which is illustrated 
with reference to three moments in the evolution of the eighteenth-century British fiscal 
system. It closes with reflections on the conditions under which political conflict may be 
ally sustainable and provides directions for further inquiry. 
 
Structural economic analysis has represented economic systems as structures of economic 
interdependencies among productive sectors (Quesnay, 1759 [1972]; Leontief, 1941; 
Pasinetti, 1981). Such representation may be used as a heuristic for the structure of 
economic interest of a given society, which can help uncover the configuration of political 
interests and the relative positions of the groups that hold those interests (Cardinale, 2012, 
2014a,b). The method used to explore the interdependencies between the economic and 
political domains is that of multi-level correspondences between economic sectors and 
interest groups (Quesnay, 1759 [1972]; Hobson, 1902). Any structural configuration of the 
economy leaves space for conflict between interest groups, conflict that is nevertheless 
bounded by the necessity to maintain the viability of the economic system. This approach 
provides a vantage point to understand both contemporary and historical political-
economic processes. A particular compelling instance of this involves debates about the 
political economy of taxation in eighteenth-century Britain.  
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Since the financial crisis, historians of eighteenth-century Britain have revisited earlier 
assumptions about factional conflict and economic interest (Pincus, 2009; Dudley, 2013; 
Pettigrew, 2013). Unfortunately, these recent discussions have not paid sufficient attention 
to the underlying interdependencies and so have produced equally schematic accounts of 
the aims of the groups they have identified. Our approach is to analyze three moments in 
the evolution of the eighteenth-century British fiscal system to articulate these dynamics. 
It becomes apparent that the comparatively high levels of taxation in Britain by the middle 
of the eighteenth-century are the result of two specific conditions: firstly, the extent to 
which the chief revenue ordinances are legal collateral of the servicing of public debt, and 
secondly, the process of negotiation by interest groups of the enrichment of the fiscal mix 
is done without sacrificing the economic viability of the sectors involved. The growth of 
the fiscal-military state in the period from 1660-1815 depended on the state’s capacity to 
borrow from an ever-growing supply of public creditors, who in turn faced increasingly 
high levels of direct taxation as individuals and indirect taxation as participants in varied 
economic domains. What makes this case interesting today is that the per capita debt/GDP 
ratios and the degree of fiscal capture (percentage of commodity output which was 
successfully taxed) were far higher at the end of the Napoleonic Wars than any period since. 
‘British exceptionalism’, contra North and Weingast (1989) and more recently Pincus 
(2009), is thus less about specific institutions, let alone constitutional arrangements, and 
more a function of the manner in which the general interest, i.e. the servicing of a 
comparatively democratized and widely held debt (Murphy, 2012; Macdonald, 2003), was 
reconciled with specific political-economic interests. 
 
If by the end of the Napoleonic Wars, Britain emerged as the most successful fiscal-military 
state, this outcome was by no means certain. Despite the fiscal experimentation of the 
Interregnum (Coffman, 2013b), Charles II was restored to a comparatively impoverished 
kingdom and relatively under-funded crown. This was so much the case that the English 
king was the subject of French charity and Dutch ridicule in the 1660s (Scott, 2003; t’Hart, 
1997). The establishment of parliamentary supremacy over crown finance in the 1690s 
might have as easily hamstrung the British fiscal state, as similar constitutional conditions 
did in the Netherlands in the eighteenth century (Gelderblom, 2009).   
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Thus Britain’s development occurred against the backdrop of similar, if less successful, 
processes in continental Europe. Much contemporary economic writing, including that of 
those who are often called Mercantilists and those who are classified as Physiocrats, was 
concerned with how to maximize tax revenues without impairing either agricultural 
production or the growing commodity economies (Vaggi, 1987; Reinert, 2011). In a 
discursive domain of an eighteenth-century ‘republic of letters,’ these economic writings 
were widely translated, read, and commented upon by writers in all European nations. On 
the continent, in most of these accounts, including Quesnay’s Tableau Économique, the 
aristocratic class (including, at times, the crown, insofar as the crown estates accrue rents) 
was identified with the absolutist state (Anderson, 1974).  In the British tradition, the ‘state’ 
had, on the other hand and by virtue of the constitutional crisis of the Civil Wars and 
Interregnum, become an artificial person that was not dependent on the idea of monarchy, 
much less on the feudal system, but instead had a distinct role in the circulation of the 
economic system by exacting charges (in the form of taxation) that would defray the costs 
of securing the whole (Skinner, 2000 [1978]; Coffman, 2013a). Yet, at the same time, the 
eighteenth-century British Whigs and Tories represented competing social and sectoral 
interests in their battles to control the fiscal apparatus of the state (Stasavage, 2003; 
Stasavage, 2007). What is striking is that although elements of these factional alignments 
remain constant over time, both parties were subject to internal divisions, which reflected 
the evolving nature of the sectoral interests and the orientation of production and trade 
geographically and in terms of the products.  This dynamism, rather than being counter-
productive, actually contributed to the flexibility of the system, by offering possibilities for 
alterations of the fiscal mix and by generating overlapping and variable political cleavages. 
The potential for contingent re-configuration of factional alignments in turn reinforced the 
participants’ perception of the need to preserve systemic sustainability. For example, 
financial historians have recently shown that the spectre of collective creditor action by 
government bondholders (in a system where particular branches of the revenue served as 
legal collateral for the servicing of specific public debts) was sufficient to remove the threat 
of debt default as a policy option (Murphy, 2012; Macdonald, 2003). 
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For Quesnay, Mirabeau, Turgot and their contemporaries, just as for those writing from 
across the English Channel such as Davenant, Hume and Smith, the challenge was to 
impose taxation in a way that satisfied competing interest groups (land owners, great 
merchants, and still powerful leading artisans) without damaging the overall productive 
capacity of the kingdom. British debates about excise taxation of beer and ale turned on 
whether or not the duty would be shifted backwards onto the landowner (in the form of 
lower prices paid for the agricultural products used in the production of excisable liquors) 
forwards onto the consumer (in the form of higher retail prices), or capitalized by the 
manufacturers. In fact, theoretical formulations of tax incidence use these debates as their 
point of departure (Seligman, 1899; Hicks, 1968).  
 
In an environment in which general equilibrium analysis is increasingly subject to caveats 
which turn on sectoral frictions, as well as those of wages and prices, the partial incidence 
analysis of the economic vs. legal incidence of taxation have a renewed importance. It is 
not always obvious that taxation falls where policy-makers, let alone the public, would 
infer from the parties liable to pay it. For example, depending on the elasticity of demand, 
a hypothetical excise on domestic wine might fall on the consumer, the grower, or the 
wholesaler, notwithstanding which party actually remits the duties to the state. Yet our 
approach does not amount to building sectoral frictions into a general equilibrium 
framework, but rather in adopting an analytical scheme that makes interdependencies, 
rather than equilibrium, the focus of attention.  
 
II. Theoretical Formulation 
Many of the eighteenth-century economic commentators discussed above apprehended the 
concept of economic interdependencies more directly than many practicing economists do 
today. Economic analysis carried out at the aggregate level of analysis does not allow us 
to see the internal structure of the economy. This is equally true for micro-founded 
macroeconomic models. In fact, those models show the aggregate economy as the sum of 
individual actors (households and firms). Whether actors are homogeneous (e.g. Kydland 
- Prescott, 1982) or heterogeneous (see Krusell - Smith 2006) these classes of models of 
the economy have no intermediate levels of aggregation, hence no internal structure.  
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In order to appreciate the internal articulation of an economic system, we need to excavate 
the structural representations suggested by contemporary writers. In English writings on 
the political economy of taxation, the existence of these internally differentiated sectoral 
interests was taken for granted and is evident from the mid-seventeenth century. Writers 
such as Henry Parker and William Petty even formulated standards of ‘equality’ in taxation, 
which respected the need to mediate amongst these competing groups (Parker, 1643; Petty, 
1662) and which analysed species of taxation in terms of their probable consequences for 
different groups. By the late seventeenth-century, writers in what became the ‘political 
arithmetik’ tradition deployed significant empirical evidence in support of their proposals 
(Davenant, 1698; Petty, 1663; Houghton, 1727; King, 1696), none of them presented a 
formal model. That one might do so is illustrated by a recent attempt to construct an input-
output table based on Gregory King’s estimates (Dodgson, 2013). 
 
The first analytical representation of the internal structure of the economy was in French 
not English. François Quesnay’s 1759 Tableau Économique represents the economy as the 
circulation of money and commodities between  socio-economic groups. It thus makes 
evident the sectors that constitute the economy and their interdependencies (see Phillips, 
1955; Hishiyama, 1960; Candela, 1975; Vaggi, 1987; Pasinetti, 2002).			
Figure 1: Quesnay’s Tableau Économique 	
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Mid-twentieth century economists, von Neumann (1945), Sraffa (1960) and Leontief 
(1941), built upon Quesnay’s insight. Leontief even described his Structure of the 
American Economy as an attempt to construct a modern Tableau. The structure of 
interdependencies thus became the basis of multi-sectoral models of economic dynamics 
(Pasinetti, 1981, 1993; Quadrio Curzio, 1967, 1975; Baranzini - Scazzieri, 1990; 
Landesmann - Scazzieri, 1996; Hagemann - Landesmann - Scazzieri, 2003). This approach 
has provided the conceptual foundation of statistical models of multi-sectoral growth 
(Stone - Brown, 1962) and is the foundation of input output tables regularly produced by 
statistical offices worldwide (Wixted - Yamano - Webb, 2006). 
An input-output table of the Quesnay-Leontief type, in Pasinetti's (1977) formulation, is 
presented in Figure 2 (where qij is the input of commodity i in industry j, and p is the price). 
 
 
Figure 2: An Input-Output Table 
 
 Outputs 
Inputs Industry 
1 
Industry 
2 
 Industry 
j 
 Final sector 
(Consumption) 
Commodity 1 𝑞!!𝑝! 𝑞!"𝑝! … 𝑞!𝑗𝑝! … 𝑞!𝑛𝑝! 
Commodity 2 𝑞"!𝑝" 𝑞""𝑝" … 𝑞"𝑗𝑝" … 𝑞"𝑛𝑝" 
 ⋮ ⋮  ⋮  ⋮ 
Commodity i 𝑞𝑖!𝑝𝑖 𝑞𝑖"𝑝𝑖 … 𝑞𝑖𝑗𝑝𝑖 … 𝑞𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑖 
 ⋮ ⋮  ⋮  ⋮ 
Final sector 
(Value added) 
𝑞𝑛!𝑝𝑛  𝑞𝑛"𝑝𝑛 … 𝑞𝑛𝑗𝑝𝑛 … 𝑞𝑛𝑛𝑝𝑛 
 
Source: Pasinetti (1977) 
 
 
As is well known, the table breaks down aggregate output into the output of n industrial 
sectors (x1 to xn). Each equation shows the output of a sector (e.g. 1) as an input into the 
other sectors (the input of good 1 into process 1, process 2, process 3, process n) and a final 
demand of good 1 (d1). This representation allows us to visualize both the sectors that make 
up the macroeconomy and the interdependencies among those sectors. For example, sector 
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1 and sector 2 are interdependent as each sector uses the output of the other sector as an 
input, and its own output is an input to the other sector. Of course not all sectors depend 
on all other sectors, so that some coefficients may be 0 (or very small). 
 
Thus when eighteenth-century authors spoke of the probable effects on particular industries, 
interest groups, or on the economy as a whole of adjusting rates of taxation on beer, malt, 
hops and land, or on French wines and Caribbean molasses, sugar or rum, their analyses 
could be mapped onto our analytical scheme. 
 
In modern terms, this framework facilitates the insight that economic sectors potentially 
correspond to political groups (Cardinale, 2012, 2014a,b). Economic sectors have interests, 
for instance in obtaining tax policies that favour them, and, at least in principle (Truman, 
1962), may compete for political influence to protect those interests. In the modern 
literature of eighteenth-century Britain, scholars have tried to map these political interests 
onto competing economic interests, but most attempts have been crude and ultimately 
unsatisfactory. An analysis of the interests of groups that respects contemporary 
understandings of these economic interdependencies can overcome the limitations of these 
approaches. Moreover, the modern formulations of the Tableau, as well as the analytical 
tools that were built upon it, provide us with a vantage point from which to reconstruct 
alternative political cleavages in a way that is both more rigorous and liable to be adapted 
to a variety of analytical contexts. For instance, models of structural dynamics in the 
presence of non-produced resources (Quadrio Curzio, 1986; Quadrio Curzio – Pellizzari, 
1999) may be used to investigate the interests of groups in the transition from one resource 
bases to another (Cardinale, 2014a), and structural models of economic fluctuations, such 
as Aftalion’s (1913) Crises Périodiques de Surproduction, may be used to reconstruct 
political cleavages between sectors along the business cycle (Cardinale - Coffman - 
Scazzieri, 2014).   
 
In the context of this essay, the structural representation of the economy based on sectoral 
interdependencies as represented in the input-output table is particularly apposite to the 
most remarkable feature of the eighteenth-century British economy, which 
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growth. As a general principle, under the technological conditions expressed by the 
determinant of the matrix of technical coefficients (the Hawkins-Simon condition), the 
ability of the system to reproduce itself and produce a surplus – that is, its ability to grow 
– is compatible with different sectoral proportions (see Schwartz, 1961; Pasinetti, 1977). 
Theoretically the system could be preserved and could grow with different relative weights 
of sectors. Contra the tone of much of the recent literature (Pincus, 2009; Dudley, 2013), 
we do not claim that the particular outcome of the sectoral conflicts we describe was either 
optimal or uniquely suited to the growth of an industrial economy, nor do we see any 
particular party or faction as more pro-social in the advancement of its interests than its 
competitors. Rather if there are any remaining claims to be made for positive externalities 
generated by constitutional structure or for institutional quality (about which we are 
agnostic), these outcomes in our model are the result of the commitment to systemic 
interests. No serious political party in this period wanted to alter fundamentally the rules 
of the game. Even proposals for a sinking fund, which would reduce the national debt, 
seldom anticipated its extinction.  
 
From the political-economic point of view, this means that there is potential for conflict 
between sectors: a sector might want to grow relative to others, and, within limits, this 
would not compromise the viability of the system. Taxation is one arena in which this 
conflict plays out. In eighteenth-century Britain, the emergence and growth of new 
manufacturing sectors ran parallel to the extension of the fiscal system into newly emerging 
arenas of economic and even social life, which generated both opportunities for new forms 
of taxation and created conflicts between stakeholders who saw their interests threatened 
or who perceived favourable treatment being meted out to older or newer sectorial interests.  
 
For instance, take the central role of excisable liquors to excise tax revenues (O’Brien, 
1988; O’Brien - Hunt, 1997). In the mid-seventeenth century, the excises on beer, ale, as 
well as cider and mead, were the mainstay of the excise system (Coffman, 2013b). Because 
the tax was collected from common brewers and brewing publicans, home-brewed beer 
escaped the levy. Once the excises on malt and hops were established in  
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1696 and 1711 respectively, the burden shifted over time to these constituents, though the 
common brewers also remained an important source of revenue. Equally distilled liquors, 
including gin and whiskies, gained in significance over the eighteenth-century, as 
eventually did salt, glass, soap and printed matter. 
 
Figure 3: Gross Revenues from Different Excisable Items, 1695-1825 
 
 
Source: National Archives, CUST 145/4-CUST 45/13); see also appendices, S.E. Fine 
(1937) 
 
Because contemporaries were aware that in the longer term, the effects of the changes in 
tax policies would ultimately be felt on wages (though they recognised frictions that would 
favour back-shifting or forward-shifting in the short and medium term), they were aware 
of possible effects on demand (Seligman, 1899; Kennedy, 1913). Equally they understood 
that some industries were better suited than others to capitalising the costs of a particular 
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tax, which is one possible impetus to industrialisation in sectors such as brewing or 
glassmaking (Mathias, 1959; Ashworth, 2003; Coffman - Gao, 2011).  
 
Contemporaries were equally aware that high levels of taxation were compatible with the 
strategy of capitalising costs only so long as the system remains within sectoral proportions 
that are compatible with its capacity to reproduce itself. In fact, one reason for abolishing 
a more generalised excise tax in 1660 was that the Lord Treasurer’s advisors believed that 
the costs to newly emerging industries were so prohibitive as to reduce employment in 
these sectors and to even render domestic manufacturers unviable. (Coffman, 2013b). 
Beyond those limits, the crisis of some sectors can affect other sectors through 
interdependencies, so the latter may be damaged too. Eighteenth-century observers 
understood this perhaps better than modern theoreticians because subsistence crises, 
though rare, were not unheard of or even outside the bounds of living memory. There was 
even a social consensus around the infrequent use of draconian social regulations (such as 
temporary prohibition on the use of wheat and barley in distilling in the 1760s) to ensure 
that such sectoral crises did not spread (Baker, 1970; Ormrod, 1985). 
 
The representation of the economy based on sectoral interdependencies thus concisely 
describes a system in which there is the possibility of conflict as well as the necessity of 
keeping that conflict within a systemically sustainable level.1 This, in turn, preserves the 
system as a whole. Under these conditions, each sector has a particular interest in its own 
survival and expansion, as well as a ‘systemic’ interest in the preservation of the system to 
which it belongs, which is itself necessary for its survival. Systemic interest derives from 
interdependencies, and expresses the fact that in a structural view, the economy is a system 
in the strong sense of the term.2 It is worth reiterating that sectors may well constitute 
potential rather than manifest interest groups  (Truman, 1962): whilst interests are 
grounded in the structure of the economic system, not every sector may be aware of them 																																																								1	Systemic interests does not require a deus ex machina, but the fact that actors have an interest in the 
viability of the system as a whole, which is necessary for the pursuit of their particular interests (Cardinale, 
2014b).  
2 Following Simon’s (1962, 2002) criterion of near-decomposability, we can define a system as a set of 
sectors in which interdependencies within the set are stronger than interdependencies with sectors outside 
the set (see Cardinale, 2014b). 	
	 13	
and act accordingly at the political level. Formulated in this fashion, it should be possible 
to see why eighteenth-century Britain was, indeed, fundamentally stable, viewed ex post, 
despite what modern scholarship now recognises as the manifold contingent political and 
economic threats to that stability, ex ante (Plumb, 1967; Langford, 1989). Although it is 
beyond the scope of the present discussion, we eventually hope to show that these systemic 
interests were not perceived as such by political actors in eighteenth-century France, 
despite other conditions (material and political) that might have been more favourable to 
development and growth. Recent work on the tobacco and salt monopolies by a leading 
scholar of eighteenth-century France points in this direction (Kwass, 2013).  
 
A major limitation of recent scholarship on eighteenth-century politics is the difficulty in 
bridging literature that emphasises the normative commitment of political actors to the 
public interest and the literature that recognises the ongoing role of ‘Old Corruption’ in 
eighteenth-century politics (Graham, 2013; Yamamoto, 2011). We reconcile this division 
by positing that the existence of a systemic interest depends on sectoral interdependencies 
and the resultant conflicts they entail. In the absence of interdependencies, the misfortunes 
and decline of one group have no effect on other groups. Our approach thus aims to 
contextualise explicitly ideological accounts of the character of a ‘public interest’ with 
accounts that depend on increasingly detailed explications of the internal structuring of 
contemporary political culture. 
 
A striking feature of the gradual enlargement of the fiscal system in eighteenth-century 
Britain, especially in the sphere of indirect taxation, is the manner in which it 
simultaneously progressed horizontally and vertically. Both an increasing variety of 
intermediate goods were taxed throughout the value chain leading to the final good and an 
increasing variety of final goods, which were produced through the inputs of an ever larger 
number of sectors, are added to the duty schedules. Such a fiscal system anticipated a 
modern value-added tax, but preserved a domain in which the precise duty levels were 
subject to competition and contestation.  Economic writers, in turn, celebrated this system 
of ‘compensatory taxation’ as superior to an older model where taxes were to be assessed 
independently as just or unjust on their own terms (Kennedy, 1913). 
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III. Historical case studies. 
 
The framework outlined above can be illustrated through three historical case studies that 
show the role of the enlargement of the fiscal mix in guaranteeing sustainability of rising 
taxation. The eighteenth-century British public revenue was a mix of direct and indirect 
taxation. As Figure 4 demonstrates, over time the indirect taxes (excise and customs, as 
well as postal duties and the stamp duties) eclipsed the land tax as revenue sources. Of 
these, the domestic excise was clearly the most important.  
 
Figure 4: Composition of British Public Revenues in £000s pounds sterling 
 
Source: Mitchell (1987), pp. 575-577 
 
As many historians of early modern public finance have noted, there is a paradox about 
British attitudes towards domestic excise taxation (Brewer, 1988; Ashworth, 2003; 
Coffman, 2013). Despite the colourful and forbidding rhetoric of the early opponents, the 
excise rapidly became a mainstay of the British public revenue after adoption in 1643 and 
was the envy of other continental powers (Coffman, 2013). Whether or not the eighteenth-
century excise was consistently less prone to smuggling and evasion than customs remains 
an open question, but the excise was widely perceived as more transparent, more 
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productive and more efficient (Brewer, 1988; Ashworth, 2003). Excise taxation was so 
firmly established by the Revolution of 1688 that it became reliable collateral for new 
species of government debt in the 1690 just as it had been during the Civil Wars and 
Interregnum (Coffman, 2013b).  
 
A) The Beer Excises 
 
The Williamite succession vastly increased the revenue requirements of the British crown 
as the new king mounted a series of continental wars (Brewer, 1988). The Treasury’s 
response was to recommend additional excise duties, which had enjoyed some success in 
the 1670s to finance the third Anglo-Dutch War. Not surprisingly, the imposition of a 
double and then triple duty on beer and ale in the early 1690s temporarily caused 
contraction within the brewing industry (Figures 5-6), damaging both common brewers 
and brewing victuallers and sharply reducing the output of barrels of strong beer by the 
large common brewers. Contemporaries had access to this data and were worried about it. 
 
The adoption of the Malt Duty in 1697 or the Hops Tax in 1711 was the result of an 
extended debate amongst government advisors and special interests about how to optimise 
beer taxes and it, in turn, triggered another shake-out of the brewing industry, but no 
popular outcry in England or Wales, despite the fact that both malt and hopes duties 
represented an extension of the excise on beer and ale (though ale in this period was defined 
by the absence of hops) to home-brewed products (Brewer, 1988, 132). The new Tory 
Parliament’s commitment in 1710 to honouring the debts incurred by the previous Whig 
Parliaments further paved the way for acceptance of the tax on hops as a means to that end. 
The Scottish malt tax of 1725 did provoke violence, but the opponents, who harnessed 
Jacobite sympathies against the Hanoverians, nevertheless justified their objections on the 
basis that the malt tax violated the terms of the fiscal union of the crowns rather than 
resistance to the excise as such (Brewer, 1988, 132). 
 
Figure 5: Organisation of the Brewing Industry 
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Source: National Archives, CUST 145/4-CUST 45/13); see appendices, S.E. Fine (1937) 
 
Figure 6: Domestic Production of Beer and Ale by Common Brewers 
 
 
 
Source: National Archives, CUST 145/4-CUST 45/13); see appendices, S.E. Fine (1937) 
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Over the 1690s and 1700s, there were repeated calls for malt and hops taxes. Especially 
with the malt taxes, advocates appealed to both systemic and specific interests. Two such 
pamphleteers, Robert Murray (1696) and Richard Stockton (1694), repeatedly argued that 
malt duties would be more equitable to the brewing industry, especially as malting 
operations often had stronger cash positions than brewers and brewing victuallers. Shifting 
the tax to malt producers would also remove the advantages that the old system conferred 
to home brewers, who were the wealthier gentry households. Moreover, it would more 
evenly distribute the downward effect on corn prices experienced when levels of excise 
taxation became so high as to require back-shifting onto landowners. Some of these authors, 
for instance Stockton, had made substantial private fortunes in the 1670s speculating on 
the effect of the additional excises on beer and ale on corn prices.  
 
There were several ramifications of the adoption of the malt and hops duties. First, as 
Figure 3 illustrated, revenue collected from the combination of the single excise, malt 
duties, and hop taxes was considerably larger, even in the early days of these duties, than 
from the single or double or treble excises. Also the brewing industry became a lot more 
industrialized in the period from 1690-1730 (Matthias, 1959) to capitalize the costs through 
the advent of porter. Opponents to the malt and hops taxes objected on a variety of grounds 
(Burnaby, 1696). One of the complaints was that this effectively shifted the incidence to 
the consumer from the producer as taxes on malt and hops also affected those who 
produced beer privately in homes. This was particularly contentious because a previous 
iteration of the tax on private brewing in the 1650s had led to attempts to convert it into a 
poll tax, which had revived dormant associations of the excise with arbitrary government 
in both the parliamentary and popular imagination  (Coffman, 2013b, p. 145). 
 
Landowners were ambivalent at first but subsequently came to support these taxes, 
especially as they coincided with an extension of the excises in other directions as well: 
hides, candles, paper, textiles. Significantly, whereas these taxes had been unsuccessful in 
the 1650s, in the 1710s they succeeded because they were seen as needed to service the 
debt (Coffman, 2013b). In short, the Harley ministry’s decision to honor its predecessors’ 
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commitments in 1710 while extending the fiscal mix (malt taxes and hop taxes) was well 
tolerated. By contrast the Excise Crisis of 1733 caught the government flat-footed. 
 
B) The Excise Crisis of 1733 
 
As we have seen above, ninety years after the introduction of excise taxation in England 
and Wales, the domestic excise on beer and ale was no longer contentious (Brewer, 1988). 
Yet Walpole’s proposal in 1733 to revive of the notion of ‘foreign excises,’ which had been 
briefly imposed during the English Civil Wars and Interregnum but were merged with 
customs by the Cavalier Parliaments in December 1660, caused a major political crisis. 
The Excise Crisis of 1733 can only be understood in its Atlantic context, against the 
backdrop of shifting attitudes to Caribbean trade and an evolving political economy of 
taxation. 
 
Before looking at the specifics, it is useful to rehearse the chronology of the controversy, 
which has been described in full in other literature (Langford, 1975). At the heart of the 
matter was Walpole’s determination to effect a permanent reduction in the land tax from 
four to one shilling in the pound.  The actual excise proposal, introduced to Parliament in 
March 1733, called for the reclassification of duties on tobacco and wine, the first a New 
World import and the second still chiefly of Spanish and French origin. The scheme did 
not represent the wholesale abolition of customs, nor did it differ categorically from 
Walpole’s successful introduction of excise duties on tea, chocolate and coffee in 1724. 
The East India Company had paid those duties under protest but without incident, which 
no doubt reassured Walpole that his new scheme was realistic when he had begun to float 
the idea in January 1733. The government’s strategy was to introduce to the tobacco bill 
first and then to consider the matter of imported wines. 
 
Despite the March print campaigns against the tobacco bill, which consisted of 
‘instructions to MPs’, the government had secured a healthy majority in mid-March in 
advance of the Easter recess. Yet afterwards, renewed pressure by Walpole’s opponents 
succeeded, at very short notice, in mobilising further resistance to the measure from a great 
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many traders and shopkeepers who would never have been affected by the legislation. In 
the weeks that followed, MPs were besieged by further campaigning from both the 
provinces and London. The public pressure was so great that Walpole’s majority began to 
collapse, and when he withdrew the legislation on 11 April, London crowds burned him 
and the queen in effigy (Langford, 1989, pp.30-31). Although Walpole retained his grip on 
power and the support of George II, his supporters struggled in the general election of 1734 
when lists were circulated of how MPs voted on the bill. More surprisingly yet still, 
Walpole had encountered resistance from the very landed gentry whose land taxes he had 
wanted to lower, and his claims that ‘honest tradesman’ would benefit from more vigorous 
prosecution of frauds and evasion had fallen on deaf ears. At least one young MP, William 
Pitt the elder, would later regret his opposition to the bill, which has furthered the suspicion 
that this was just another tawdry example of the heat of faction in Hanoverian politics 
(Langford, 1975, p.3). Yet despite the fact that Pitt himself would subsequently reintroduce 
the foreign excises during his own ministry, which gives grist to the charge of hypocrisy 
and opportunism, the dispute also revealed fundamentally irreconcilable visions of taxation. 
 
Forty-five years after the Revolution of 1688, the challenge for Parliament was how to tax 
imported goods from the Atlantic economies. As can be seen in Figure 4, the Customs were 
a well-established if increasingly stagnant source of revenue. The overseas merchants were 
used to a system whereby the shipmaster declared the value of his cargo and was assessed 
on that basis. Walpole’s plan was to move certain key imported goods (wines, teas, tobacco, 
etc) from Customs to the Excise, where Excise officers would assess the duty on the 
wholesaler or first buyer as had been done during the Interregnum. 
 
On a prime facie level, there were some obvious problems with the plan. Firstly, it exposed 
a much larger number of people to direct interaction with the state. Whether or not the 
actual incidence of the tax would be shifted onto the consumer, the opponents to this 
measure felt it was an unacceptable extension of state power. There was a resistance to 
reframing what was seen as a tax on a specific sector (importers of particular goods) onto 
consumption more broadly. The systemic interest of public bondholders was less effective 
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in 1733 than in 1710. Partly this was because there were those who wanted to see the public 
debt paid off rather than made perpetual (Langford, 1975).  
 
The Excise Scheme was catastrophic for Walpole’s parliamentary management, but it 
should not be considered in isolation. Although the tobacco bill was withdrawn in April 
1733, the Molasses Act was passed and finally given royal assent in May of that year.  
Walpole’s strategy for fiscal reform had been two-fold: to pay for the reduction of the land 
tax through an excise on imported tobacco from North America and wine from continental 
Europe, while simultaneously imposing a high tax on imports of foreign molasses from the 
Spanish and French West Indies into colonial North America and Ireland. In this incidence, 
high customs duties became a weapon of economic warfare rather than solely a source of 
revenue, precisely because they were understood to be a deterrent to importation. 
Walpole’s project was one of reshaping the terms of trade within the British overseas 
empire as much as it was about changing the composition of the fiscal mix in the metropole.  
 
The records of the Board of Trade in the National Archives are replete with attempts to 
understand domestic commodity taxation and to apply it to the imperial frame (TNA CO 
390/3-5). Yet the problem facing Walpole was rather stark indeed. In order for his scheme 
to work, either the inland duties on wine and tobacco had to be set, as his critics complained, 
at a level that would double their cost basis, or the scale of evasions and smuggling in 
Customs had to be such as to mean that half the revenue to which the state was entitled 
went uncollected (see Figure 7). By contrast, the domestic duty on strong beer and ale was 
consistently well under a fifth of its retail price, and conventionally represented no more 
than a third of its total cost. This was perhaps more alarming because imports of tobacco 
and wine had largely stagnated, compared, for instance, to sugar, which had steadily risen. 
 
Figure 7: Value of Selected Imports and Land Taxes in £000 Sterling 
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Source: British Historical Statistics, pp. 462-3; 570-1. 
 
Despite their volatility, sugar imports might have been a more sensible target of the scheme, 
but that would have put Parliament afoul of the same plantation owners who were so 
fiercely lobbying for the Molasses Act. In the late 1640s and 1650s, when the duties on 
tobacco and wine were just as high, by contrast, were less than a quarter to a third of the 
total excise revenues, and nowhere near sufficient to replace the revenue from the 
assessments (Coffman, 2013, p.102). What remains unclear is why there was no room for 
compromise, in the form of a more modest reduction of the land tax and a more modest 
inland duty on tobacco and imported wine? There is no archival evidence that anyone 
suggested such a compromise, so a definitive answer is beyond the scope of this essay.  Yet 
the question paints up another paradox, which was the heart of debates about taxation in 
March 1733. And that is how to reconcile the non-fiscal and fiscal consequences of tax 
policy. The prohibitive duties of the Molasses Act were meant to discourage importation 
of foreign manufactures in North America and Ireland, whereas the Excise Scheme’s 
equally onerous duties on wine and tobacco were not supposed to damage trade. MPs and 
their constituents alike could be forgiven for doubting the plausibility of such a claim. 
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Ultimately the measure failed and Walpole had to find other means of raising additional 
revenues. The solution to the problem of Atlantic trade was found instead in enlargement 
of the Sugar Acts and the imposition of the Molasses Act. The episode threw into relief the 
beginnings of divisions within the Tories and Whigs that would lead to reconfigurations of 
these parties in the later eighteenth century. Twenty years later, in the 1750s, foreign 
excises were reintroduced, but not in lieu of customs. Rather they were imposed on 
commodities that were thought to or in fact did ordinarily escape the customs office. By 
the outbreak of the American Revolutionary wars, nearly half the excise revenue came 
from foreign goods. This is not at all well understood. The consequences of this for 
domestic manufacturing is yet to be properly researched, but the ad hoc nature of these 
additional impositions reflects the process of negotiation described above.  
 
C) The Income Tax 
Direct taxation in England and Wales also has a long history. Tudor subsidies operated on 
the theoretical basis that the king was the largest landowner and should be able to ‘live on 
his own,’ but might be subsidized by lesser landowners, especially to make effectual 
defense of the kingdom (Coffman, 2013b). Thus while the customs revenue had 
traditionally gone to the navy (a principle that continued into the eighteenth century) and 
the excise revenue went to service the debt (which was largely the result of the crown 
needing to keep armies in the field), direct taxation was seen in terms of ordinary supply 
in the sense of supplementing crown income and as extraordinary supply in the sense of 
raising additional revenue in wartime. This was the theoretical basis for the very high level 
of Assessments during the Interregnum and also of the land taxes, which were settled in 
the late seventeenth century, as is evident from Figure 4. Income taxes were virtually 
unheard of in the British Isles and elsewhere in Europe, except insofar as the 
Commonwealth and Cromwellian regimes had used them as punitive measures against 
royalists. 
 
The problem facing the regime during the Napoleonic Wars was two-fold. First, the 
continental blockade had produced a boon to British domestic manufacturers (provided 
they could get raw materials) and to British agriculture. Marginal lands that had not been 
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cultivated since the Black Death were brought back into production and grain prices were 
higher than they had been in two generations (Mingay, 1989). This meant that high levels 
of taxation where comparatively well-targeted, but once 60-70% of domestic commodity 
taxation was captured by the excise, additional impositions became both unrealistic and 
widely recognized to be destructive to trade (Bordo, 2005, p.369). Although it is much 
harder to estimate the level of smuggling and evasion, it is not difficult to imagine that it 
increased as well. 
 
Contemporaries were also aware that the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars and 
especially the blockade had produced some windfalls to certain sectors. Continued high 
levels of indirect taxation, however, threatened the viability of particular sectors at the risk 
of widespread economic hardship (O’Brien, 1988). The imposition of the income tax thus 
represented not so much redistribution in the modern sense but rather an attempt to extend 
fiscal capture in directions that had, ipso facto, escaped the state’s reach. One thing that 
made it more realistic than it might have been otherwise was that the suspension of 
convertibility made it possible to pay income taxes with bank notes. Otherwise, the scarcity 
of small coin, which had been a feature of British economic life for over a century, would 
have interfered with the tax’s collection (Neal, 1998). Politically it was accepted under the 
reasoning that stakeholders had an obligation to assist the regime in defending the kingdom. 
This emphasis on stakeholders, on the one hand, mimicked the character of the franchise, 
which was very far from universal, but on the other hand had the feature of ensuring a level 
of progressivity that was not the natural outcome of indirect taxation.  
 
Whether or not property qualifications meant that landowners suffered the effects of the 
tax disproportionately remains an open question, but the aim was to impose an 
extraordinary (i.e. temporary) level that would meet an immediate necessity (Daunton, 
2007). Ironically, this was the original logic for the excises during the Interregnum (that 
they fell equally on malignants and neutrals as well as those loyal to the regime) (Coffman, 
2013b), but unlike the excises the income taxes were, indeed, repealed after Waterloo. A 
much more serious issue for sectoral interests in the 1820s was the manner in which the 
return to gold convertibility was managed in a way that favored some sectors at the expense 
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of others, but that was largely a product of the Bank of England’s ambiguous role as a para-
statal with several different constituencies: its own shareholders, government bondholders, 
and the other financial institutions with which it simultaneously cooperated and competed 
(Neal, 1998). The crisis of 1825 could profitably be further explored in this way.  
 
IV. Discussion 
 
We have proposed a structural and historical approach to explore the cleavages between 
political groups over taxation, and particularly the conditions under which rising taxation 
is politically sustainable. Models of structural economic analysis, notably those based on 
modern formulations of Quesnay’s Tableau Économique, represent the internal structure 
of an economy by showing its sectors and their interdependencies. They thus allow 
conceptualizing political cleavages in terms of the interplay of economic interdependencies 
between sectors and political conflict between the groups that represent those sectors. We 
have explored the ability of this approach to illuminate political and economic processes 
by referring to taxation in eighteenth-century Britain. 
 
Our approach provides specific insights into the sustainability of taxation. In particular, we 
have shown that what matters is not the absolute level of taxation but rather how it is 
structured. In eighteenth-century Britain, the incremental rise of excises and the income 
tax were seen as serving a ‘systemic interest’ in the context of the fiscal-military state. This, 
in turn, depended on an awareness of interdependencies.  Because the franchise was still 
relatively limited, there were no political parties that operated outside this system of 
interdependencies. The fact that most (though not all) of the public debt was held 
domestically and that domestic bondholders had realistic prospects of creditor action may 
differentiate this somewhat from the situation in Europe or the developing world today.  
 
This essay also suggests that, contrary to received wisdom, high levels of taxations do not 
necessarily hinder economic growth. In 1814-1820 British debt peaked at 260% of GDP 
(Reinert - Rogoff, 2009) and the domestic excise was 60-70% of output (Bordo, 2005). Yet 
Britain was on the verge of a period of sustained economic growth. Much of the current 
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work on public sector crowding out private investment ignores sectoral interdependencies 
in favour of aggregates, and this may be a reason why it finds it difficult to explain 
sustained growth in the presence of high taxation.  
 
In conclusion, our approach suggests that the awareness of and commitment to systemic 
interest in the construction of the particular interests of political groups, as well as the 
building of fiscal systems that favour such awareness and commitment, may be a 
fundamental element for the political sustainability of taxation – and one that is arguably 
just as relevant today. 
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